United Nations A/CN.10/PV.185

General Assembly

Official Records

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

185th Meeting
Tuesday, 19 April 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Mongbe . . . . . (Benin)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General exchange of views on the three substantive agenda items (continued)

The Chairman *(interpretation from French)*: I wish to congratulate the first speaker on being so punctual.

Mr. Seim (Norway): On behalf of my delegation, I have pleasure in conveying to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election to the position of Chairman for the 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission.

The reform programme which was adopted in 1990 has to a certain extent strengthened the role of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body. Further improvements, however, seem necessary. As was the case last year, we are again faced with the task of concluding the work on two of the items on the agenda during the coming three weeks. We hope, however, that this year's session will be successful.

Norway has a firm and longstanding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. During the last few years we have witnessed unprecedented developments in nuclear-arms control and disarmament. The implementation of the START agreements, now under way, includes commitments to massive reductions in the weapons systems that have posed the greatest threat to our future. However, the growing threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to other parts of the world casts a shadow over these favourable developments.

Norway participates actively in efforts aimed at the secure implementation of denuclearization in Russia and in Ukraine. The dismantling of strategic delivery devices is important. Equally important are other challenges, which are not confined to military issues, but involve environmental problems and the need for viable economic development. The secure handling of nuclear material, including environmentally safe storage of such material, is of particular importance to us.

Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the indefinite extension of its provisions will be vital in the international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, as will a complete ban on nuclear testing. The latter has been a long-standing Norwegian policy objective. We are encouraged that a multilateral negotiation effort to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty is finally under way. We expect all nuclear-weapon States to respect a moratorium until the negotiations have been successfully concluded. Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago located in a particularly vulnerable Arctic environment close to the Norwegian border, is the only remaining Russian test site and the most important source of radioactive contamination in the far north. We would be deeply concerned if nuclear testing were to be resumed.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty verification regime should be sufficiently strong and effective to ensure that any potential violator runs a severe risk of being detected. A global seismic network would form the basis of the verification system, supplemented by other techniques that might be deemed useful and fall within acceptable cost parameters. We look forward to the third global seismic test that is now being prepared by the Group of Scientific

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Experts. Norway stands ready to take an active part in this crucial test.

One of the greatest threats to our common security is the spread of weapons of mass destruction to States that do not feel bound by the rules of international conduct. The attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is seeking to evade its safeguard obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), continues to cause widespread concern. Such conduct is a challenge to the authority of international law, multinational institutions and the multilateral non-proliferation regime. This issue must be settled peacefully and without further delay.

The scope of the IAEA safeguards regime should be extended, *inter alia,* to prevent the diversion of fissile material and sensitive technology and equipment for weapons purposes. The export-control regimes for technologies, components and materials which can be used for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are important measures for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and have been established solely for this purpose. The export-control regimes have proved to build confidence and stability, and in our opinion they have not hampered the efforts to ensure the rights of States to have access to know-how for peaceful purposes.

The chemical weapons Convention constitutes a triumph for multilateral disarmament negotiations. We call on other States to ratify the Convention quickly so that it can enter into force in January 1995. Norway has concluded the ratification process and has deposited the instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Norway supports the establishment of a treaty which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As on numerous occasions when disarmament issues have been discussed, we once again feel obliged to put on record our regret that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to reach consensus on the question of enlarging its membership. There is no doubt that the introduction of new members would strengthen the position of the Conference as a multilateral negotiating body, as well as its legitimacy and credibility.

Mr. Lamamra (Algeria) *(interpretation from French):* It is a special pleasure for me to see the dynamic and creative representative of brotherly Benin presiding over the work of the Disarmament Commission. This, in addition to being a well-deserved tribute to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your country, is an honour for Africa at a time when it is endeavouring to elaborate legal instruments to give concrete form to its status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity proclaimed in 1964.

It is also a great pleasure for me to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election and to express to Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil the Algerian delegation's great appreciation of his wise leadership during the last session of the Commission.

The overall political climate prevailing in international relations and the promising prospects opened up by the results of the First Committee's work, as well as by actions initiated recently in the Conference on Disarmament, create a favourable set of circumstances for the methodical continuation of work on disarmament and on strengthening international peace and security. Indeed, with the prolonged rationalization of the Commission's work, concrete results are expected of us here upon the conclusion of the study of two of the three items on the agenda. The Commission would thereby be playing the active and constructive role that it should play by taking effectively in hand certain concerns of the international community relating to disarmament and international security, concerns that are reflected in the priority objectives of the current negotiations aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament.

Algeria is firmly committed to the disarmament process, to which it attaches great importance. Its expenditures on equipment for national defence remains at a considerably low percentage of its gross national product, well below the percentage of other countries of comparable size or having comparable resources.

In the nuclear arena, Algeria has voluntarily submitted its two radioisotope research and production reactors to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. Algeria's announcement in December 1993 of its decision in principle to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was intended as an effective political contribution to strengthening the authority of that international legal instrument, as well as an additional act of support for the universal objective of non-proliferation.

That very important objective should benefit from the fundamental changes that have come about on the

international scene, changes that hasten the beginning of the end for the military uses of the atom and, necessarily, the doctrines founded on the possibility of such uses. It is therefore important that decisive progress be made in negotiations to halt all nuclear testing, as well as in connection with efforts regarding the production of fissionable material and security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Algeria's activities in promoting nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East come within this framework.

Algeria shares the widely held conviction that progress in science and technology should be used not only to develop disarmament measures, thereby strengthening international peace and security, but also for the socio-economic progress of all mankind. For this reason Algeria considers that, while we ensure that science and technology are used for exclusively peaceful purposes, no action should be taken that might arbitrarily hamper the flow of scientific and technical exchange or the transfer of technologies for the high-priority and legitimate objectives of development.

The international community must not resign itself to depriving the vast South of the benefits of scientific and technological advances for economic development and environmental protection. Hence, monitoring systems that could be universally accepted and applied in a non-discriminatory way can gain legitimacy only if there is full respect for the need to promote development. The work of the Commission would therefore gain from being based on the sovereign right of States to free access to scientific and technological knowledge for peaceful purposes of economic and social development, and its goal should be the realization of that right.

We must not lose sight of the need to avoid possible negative effects for the disarmament process and for international security of the dissemination of scientific knowledge, but it is not clear that this can be met other than by costly monitoring regimes and machinery, whose operation would increase the obstacles facing developing countries as they strive to master the tools of progress and modern life.

Developments in international relations and daily experience in many parts of the world put the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in perspective, while highlighting the highly negative consequences for the security and stability of those regions of illegal transfers of conventional weapons.

The question of illicit arms transfers is understandably a matter of interest for the Disarmament Commission. It is a matter of grave concern in terms of international security. Illicit arms transfers are an international phenomenon closely linked with terrorism, drug trafficking and major crime. They promote violent destabilization and create major difficulties for States as those States work to protect their people and their resources.

Given the scope of this phenomenon in regions that do not manufacture weapons, it is clearly vital to deal with the evil at its root; hence the special responsibility of producer countries and their duty to take strict measures to control the destination of the goods they sell, as well as the importance and value of adopting guidelines for Member States to establish effective multilateral cooperation at several operational levels to combat this villainous phenomenon, which will grow in size and scope unless the international community deals with it forcefully and speedily.

Mr. Ponce (Ecuador) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Let me begin, Sir, by saying how pleased my delegation is to see you in the Chair for this session. We are certain that your diplomatic and human qualities, and the support on which you can count from the Vice-Chairmen, the Rapporteur and the Secretariat, will enable the Commission to continue its important contribution to peace and disarmament, just as it did at the last session under the chairmanship of Ambassador Luiz de Araujo Castro, whom we congratulate on the work he accomplished.

From 8 to 12 March last year the First Committee met to consider the status of the United Nations disarmament and international security machinery. It was clear from the debate that the Disarmament Commission provides an important opportunity for thorough debate on the central issues of disarmament and arms control. There was a general feeling that the Commission's work made it possible in many cases for the analysis of various items to mature and form a foundation for more specific negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Resolution 47/54 G clearly supports the activities of the Commission, and

> "Reaffirms the role of the Disarmament Commission as a specialized deliberative body". *(resolution 47/54 G, para. 3)*

The ongoing evolution and improvement of the Commission's working methods have fostered positive results. Last year we adopted a set of "Guidelines and

recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security". The result of arduous labour under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, this will guide the action of the international community with respect to regional disarmament. Hence, we were unable to support resolution 48/75 J, which ignored the existence of the Guidelines and called on the Conference on Disarmament to formulate a set of principles on this subject, which is clearly a duplication of work, something which all Member States decried at the resumed session. We are also concerned at the proliferation of General Assembly resolutions on regional disarmament, which can have little practical effect on promoting disarmament activities at the regional level.

My delegation attaches special importance to the successful conclusion of our work on the item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". It is vital that the guidelines and recommendations we adopt on this item should strongly promote universal norms that would encourage the free flow of science and technology for peaceful purposes, help channel the enormous resources now used for military ends to sustainable human development, and establish stable, non-discriminatory rules for the transfer of technology for military purposes. This exercise must not be viewed as an opportunity to consolidate regimes that only restrict the transfer of science and technology now in the hands of a single country or a small group of countries. We can succeed only if our mandate is viewed as a first step towards the inevitable adoption of universal rules on this subject, agreed by the international community in multilateral negotiations, with buyers and sellers of science and technology able to defend their interests on an equal footing. The guidelines on which we agree must have as their sole purpose the achievement of international peace and security, which requires full respect for the right to development. My delegation pledges its cooperation to the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Peggy Mason, whose tireless dedication will, we are sure, contribute to the successful conclusion of our work.

The Working Group on the item "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" was revitalized by the working paper circulated by its Chairman, the representative of Ukraine. We are confident that, by achieving balance between measures to prevent proliferation on the one hand and those aimed at completely eliminating nuclear weapons on the other, we shall be able to make substantive progress on this priority item. Moreover, the discussions will certainly be enlightening for delegations which will be participating in the conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will take place in 1995.

The delegation of Ecuador welcomes the fact that at its organizational meeting the Commission agreed by consensus to include on its agenda the item entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". The document circulated by the Chairman of Working Group III, the representative of Colombia, provides useful information for determining the scope of the illicit arms trade, the actions that States can take domestically and the international cooperation necessary to put an end to this phenomenon, which nurtures destabilizing movements in every region and threatens social cohesion, economic progress, human rights and democratic systems.

I should like to reaffirm to you, Sir, and through you to the other members of the Bureau and the Chairmen of the Working Groups, the spirit of cooperation which the delegation of Ecuador will maintain throughout this session of the Commission.

Mr. Tanaka (Japan): Let me, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, extend my heartfelt congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. My delegation is confident that under your able guidance the 1994 substantive session of the Commission will be a genuinely fruitful one, and wishes to assure you of its active cooperation.

Last year, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, Working Group II agreed on guidelines and recommendations for a regional approach to disarmament. This was indeed a notable achievement. Japan hopes that this and similar international agreements that take into account the characteristics of a specific region will provide a basis for further concrete progress in arms control and disarmament.

The end of the cold war brought about the collapse of an international order that had been based on the East-West rivalry. Pending the consolidation of a new world order, the present unstable situation may be expected to continue for some time. While the threats to world peace and stability which prevailed throughout the cold-war era have dissipated considerably, new dangers have taken their place, not only in Europe but in various other parts of the world. Although the exact nature and implications of these

new dangers are as yet unclear, they are effecting fundamental changes in the international strategic situation. It is against the background of such changes, and in recognition of the dangers inherent in a world in flux, that the international community is paying ever greater attention to the issue of non-proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. And so, as we address the three items on this year's agenda - nuclear disarmament, the role of science and technology, and international arms transfers - it is essential that we bear in mind the evolving political and security situation.

Because the Commission focused its attention last year on other items on its agenda, it made no substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes that at this session the Commission will build upon developments that have occurred in the field since then and will produce meaningful results on this important topic. Japan is pleased to note in particular the commencement of the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to the Russian Federation in accordance with the trilateral agreement reached in January between the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. We hope that all nuclear weapons deployed throughout the former Soviet Union will be moved safely and expeditiously to the Russian Federation, and that Ukraine will become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State at the earliest possible date. At the same time, we trust that START I and START II will be firmly implemented.

Japan has extended grant assistance totalling about $100 million for the purposes of dismantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and facilitating the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, as confirmed by its Prime Minister at the 1993 session of the General Assembly, Japan supports the indefinite extension of the NPT and hopes that the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, under way in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, will be concluded at an early date. We also anticipate that the negotiations on a "cut-off" will soon commence in the Conference on Disarmament, thus ensuring an auspicious environment for the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

It is truly regrettable that the Disarmament Commission failed last year to agree on a paper on the role of science and technology, despite the intensive deliberations that continued until the last minute under the able leadership of Ambassador Mason of Canada, Chairman of the drafting group. The Chairman's paper, presented at the end of the session, reflects in a balanced manner the many and divergent views of the delegations which participated in the deliberations, while aiming at the creation of cooperative relations between supplier and recipient countries of high technology. Japan believes that the paper can serve as a basis for the ongoing discussion of this topic. I would caution, however, that we should not dwell on the negative side of scientific and technological development in terms of its acceleration of arms races, lest that hinder our efforts to formulate objective criteria for the international community. Japan considers that, in order to avoid any duplication of effort, we should first sort out various aspects of science and technology which are in themselves neutral, and then discuss broader themes. These include the use of science and technology in ways that will not threaten efforts to maintain and strengthen international peace and security, and the creation of cooperative relations between supplier and recipient countries in the area of the transfer of technology. Japan considers it important to agree in this way on various elements of science and technology as a package.

Japan is one of the countries which believe that the existing export control regimes - such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Australia Group - have functioned effectively and made significant contributions to the non-proliferation of weapons. We therefore do not share the view held by some that the goal of non-proliferation will not be advanced through unilateral export-control measures taken by groups of supplier countries. On the other hand, Japan is fully aware that, in today's world of ever-increasing interdependence, the international situation is too fluid to yield a solution that addresses the requirements both of promoting the non-proliferation of weapons and of ensuring access to technology for economic development solely through existing regimes.

From the perspective of supplier countries, the most urgent tasks before us are the development of effective export-control systems in all countries which have the capacity to supply weapon-related materials, and the promotion of a commitment to non-proliferation, especially of weapons of mass destruction.

On the other hand, one issue which needs to be addressed is the development of national export-control systems by recipient countries - if necessary with the help of supplier countries - to ensure that the technologies obtained will be neither diverted to military purposes nor re-exported to conflict areas or conflict-prone areas. Japan believes that it is important for recipient countries to endeavour to regulate themselves instead of placing the

onus solely on supplier countries. Indeed, I cannot help but believe that such efforts made by recipient countries will play an intrinsic role in facilitating the smoother transfer of technology in the future.

If we are to succeed in formulating a consensus document, it is essential that delegations seek flexible and practicable guidelines, bearing in mind the changing world situation and possible future developments, and that they refrain from focusing too intently on the details of the text. All delegations must recognize that progress will not be made if they insist on clinging to anachronistic norms. If the Disarmament Commission remains a forum only for the exchange among delegations of well-known views, its very *raison d'être* is bound to be questioned.

The issue of international arms transfers involves countries all over the world and has an important bearing not only on political and security questions but also on the economic needs of each country. Naturally, therefore, positions on this issue vary from country to country, making it extremely difficult to find an appropriate way to approach it.

Japan believes that if we are to tackle this problem effectively it is important that we first of all try to enhance transparency and openness. Toward this end, Japan has been actively involved in the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and in efforts to ensure its smooth operation. The Register is a system for exchanging information so as to prevent the excessive accumulation of weapons, and as such is a useful confidence-building measure. We hope that a greater number of countries will participate in the second Register, which will be continued this year in an effort to achieve universality.

Responding to a request conveyed in a General Assembly resolution, this year the United Nations Disarmament Commission is conducting its deliberations on international arms transfers by focusing on substantive questions of arms control that go beyond the confidence-building measures I have just mentioned. While there have been steady efforts to deal with issues concerning weapons of mass destruction within the framework of the non-proliferation treaty, the chemical weapons treaty, the bacteriological weapons treaty and other relevant international arrangements for the non-proliferation or elimination of such weapons, the issue of transfer of conventional weapons has never been discussed adequately because it elicits such widely divergent views. If the Disarmament Commission could this year suggest a number of approaches to the consideration of this issue, it would be making a significant contribution.

Japan believes our discussion of this issue should include the following two points:

First, there should be consideration of the need to study certain international norms on official transfers between States and, if necessary, consideration of specific methodologies to establish such norms.

Secondly, there should be consideration of the need to ensure that the appropriate legal framework and administrative institutions are in place in each country for the effective restriction of arms trading and consideration of possible international cooperation, particularly in terms of how each country might effectively deal with illicit trading of arms, and of what measures the international community can take to deal with such trade. Typically, illicit arms trading is carried out in places remote from the administrative facilities that control the export and import of arms. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the principles involved as well as the content, scope, value, and so forth, of the trade. We know, however, that illicit trade contributes significantly to the continuation and expansion of conflicts. It is therefore imperative that we consider measures to combat it. A number of countries regard the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as severely limited since it deals only with official transfers between Governments. But I believe that if we seriously address the issue of illicit trade those countries will be encouraged to take a more cooperative attitude toward the Register, and will thus contribute to the achievement of its universality.

In order to prevent such unstable elements as incipient territorial disputes and tribal and religious rivalries in various parts of the world from developing into armed conflicts, and to prevent the escalation of conflicts, Japan believes the time has come for the countries that supply weapons to develop and strengthen a framework of voluntary restrictions. And it is time for the international community as a whole to examine the possibility of establishing strict international norms on the transfer of arms.

Mr. Shcherbak (Russian Federation) *(interpretation from Russian)*: I should like first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to wish you every success in your work. Naturally, you can count on the cooperation of the Russian delegation.

The detailed position of the Russian Federation on the issues of disarmament was set forth in the statement by the Russian delegation at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I shall comment only on a few matters relating to disarmament, particularly those before the Disarmament Commission.

During the post-confrontation era, the process of nuclear disarmament has been continuing to develop successfully. The issues of implementation of international agreements in the nuclear field were, as is well known, at the heart of the Russian-American summit meeting in Moscow, where, on 14 January this year, major documents were signed. The Presidents of Russia and the United States signed the Moscow Declaration and the Joint Statement on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery and, together with the President of Ukraine, they signed the Trilateral Statement on the progress that has been made in reducing nuclear forces.

I should like to comment on our perception of disarmament priorities with regard to multilateral disarmament. They are as follows: ensuring strict and consistent implementation of agreements and arrangements already reached; strengthening existing regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons and means of delivery; prohibiting nuclear tests; integrating arms control into the broad context of international security; enhancing efficiency in the multilateral mechanisms for deliberations and negotiations in this field.

We favour more active use of the Security Council's potential - for example, in exercising effective control over the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in regulating arms transfers to "hot spots". Integrating arms control into the United Nations peace-keeping operations is, we feel, an important area of activity. Agreements providing for guarantees against the renewal of hostilities, with a strong disarmament component, could become an integral element of peace-keeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations.

We believe that the international community's efforts in the immediate future should focus on concluding multilateral agreements for a complete and comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The Russian delegation is satisfied with the progress made in negotiations on a nuclear-test ban at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We believe that this progress offers hope for speedy progress towards our ultimate goal. That goal would undoubtedly be served if all nuclear Powers honoured the nuclear-test-explosion moratorium.

Multilateral efforts to reinforce the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are now of special importance. Russia regards the Treaty as a key disarmament instrument, and we have consistently favoured universal participation in the Treaty and the Treaty's indefinite prolongation at the 1995 Review Conference. Reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime is important in and of itself, and achieving this should not depend on the settlement of other disarmament issues.

We attach great importance to the elaboration, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, of a multilateral legally binding agreement on security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Russia, together with other nuclear Powers, is actively seeking a common formula of "negative" guarantees which could remove the concerns of non-nuclear States.

The problem of the cessation of nuclear materials production for arms purposes is also awaiting its solution. We advocate multilateral negotiations to formulate an agreement on the cessation of weapon-grade fissionable materials production within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

The priorities in the field of nuclear disarmament which were outlined by the Russian delegation are in full conformity with the Commission's efforts to formulate guidelines and recommendations for the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security", which we are to try to finalize at the current session, based on the outline submitted by the Chairman of the Working Group. The Russian delegation hopes that the Commission will successfully resolve this question.

At the previous session the Commission continued work on formulating guidelines and recommendations on "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". During the session certain difficulties and problems were identified, hampering harmonization of the text, especially in connection with some provisions of the third section, concerning the transfer of dual-purpose high technologies. In our opinion, our efforts should be focused on the search for compromise and balanced solutions so that the document can be harmonized and the work finished. An unofficial document covering the consultations on the subject during the forty-eighth session

of the General Assembly, prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Peggy Mason, could be of great help. Russia believes that the study of the influence of science and technology on international security should remain a priority issue for the United Nations.

In order to make United Nations activities more efficient, wider use should be made of the United Nations potential to develop international cooperation in the fields of conversion and arms liquidation. This cooperation should include expert and financial support, as well as reduction of expenses related to the verification of compliance with the disarmament agreements through harmonization by major industrial powers of the optimum ways of the "control technologies" cost reduction.

The question of the illicit conventional arms trade is becoming more and more urgent in present conditions, and its inclusion on the agenda is timely. We take note of the input into the work on this problem made by Colombia, which has submitted a very useful working document. There is general recognition of the threat of the uncontrolled arms trade to international and regional security and of the necessity to avoid arms supplies that could lead to military and political destabilization, both between countries and at the regional level, and could support international terrorism.

In this context, Russia is prepared to reach with all interested States, on a non-discriminatory basis, agreements on regulation and then limitation of international arms supplies. The participation of all major arms-supplying and arms-receiving countries in the international regulation of conventional arms transfers is of great importance to ensuring the effectiveness of this process. Effective control over the illicit arms trade is impossible without political measures aimed at the prevention and settlement of local and regional conflicts and at easing tension, or without disarmament measures.

Developing and strengthening national legislation and enforcement mechanisms on arms exports and imports are vital for the eradication of the illicit arms trade. Russia's conventional arms transfers control policy measures up to its international obligations in this area and its export control system meets the international standards.

All those aspects of the illicit conventional arms trade should, in our opinion, be reflected in the guidelines and directives to be elaborated by the Commission in this field.

Of course, we also need to examine the constructive proposals made by a number of delegations in the course of the Commission's present session concerning the methodology of our future work and the relevant texts adopted by regional organizations, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Mr. Norberg (Sweden): I wish first, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission this year. I am confident that under your able leadership we will do some useful work.

This year's session takes place against the background of important and encouraging developments in the field of arms control and disarmament. At the same time, some developments give cause for concern.

Following the START agreements, stipulating far-reaching reductions of nuclear arsenals, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty are well under way. The Conference is also discussing the holding of negotiations on a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In The Hague, the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is pursuing its work in preparation for the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. However, only five countries - including Sweden - have so far ratified the Convention. My Government urges States to ratify the Convention without delay, and thus contribute to its earliest possible entry into force.

A special conference will be held in Geneva in September this year on the subject of a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. Sweden attaches great importance to this conference and hopes that it will produce positive and tangible results.

We note with satisfaction that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is now in operation and that some 80 States reported to the Register last year. My Government would welcome broader adherence, which would further enhance the confidence-building character of this instrument. At the present initial stage, priority should be given to consolidating its functioning, before measures aimed at its further development are taken.

Efforts are now being made further to strengthen the 1980 Convention on certain conventional weapons, particularly with regard to restrictions on the use of antipersonnel land mines. Sweden considers that naval mines and blinding laser weapons should also be included in these efforts. In this context, I should like to recall that in 1991 Sweden proposed an additional protocol to the Convention on naval mines. A Group of governmental experts has recently started its work in Geneva in preparation for a conference next year to review the Convention and its protocols. My country is honoured by the decision of the expert Group to appoint the Swedish representative as its Chairman.

I have highlighted some important elements of the current efforts in the arms control and disarmament field. Ahead of us lies, furthermore, the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference. It is, *inter alia*, against this general background that the Disarmament Commission meets this year for its substantive session.

It is essential that the Commission make an active and concrete contribution to the disarmament process at this juncture. The successful conclusion of the agenda items, "Objective information on military matters", in 1992, and, "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", in 1993, sets an example. The Commission will this year conclude its work on the important items concerning nuclear disarmament and science and technology. It is, moreover, to start deliberations on international arms transfers. I should like to offer a few comments regarding these agenda items.

Sweden welcomes the significant progress in recent years relating to nuclear disarmament. The START agreements constitute important and ground-breaking milestones in this context. It is imperative that these agreements be implemented fully and without delay.

Sweden attaches the utmost importance to nuclear non-proliferation. It is our strong wish that the 1995 Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty decide on an indefinite extension of the Treaty. My Government urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty, particularly those that harbour nuclear weapons on their territories.

No fewer than 163 States have now acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, making it the most successful disarmament Treaty ever. At the same time, there are grave concerns about the refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to honour its obligations under the non-proliferation regime and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect nuclear installations in that country.

My delegation would like to stress the importance of successfully concluding the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban before the NPT Conference next year. Sweden urges all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further tests in order to support favourable conditions for these negotiations. Sweden's deep commitment to this issue is reflected by the draft treaty text we have presented in the Conference on Disarmament and by the profound interest Sweden has continuously taken over many years in the search for a comprehensive test ban. It is also important that negotiations start as soon as possible on a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.

My delegation welcomes Mr. Volodymyr Khandogy as the new Chairman of the Working Group covering the agenda item on nuclear disarmament. We are confident that the Group will successfully complete its work this year under his able guidance. We have received with interest the working paper prepared by the Chairman, and consider it a good basis for the further deliberations of the Commission with respect to this agenda item.

My delegation regrets that the Commission failed to conclude its work on the agenda item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. The issue is admittedly complicated. However, efforts must now be made to reach agreement on the outstanding matters, important but few in number, based on last year's Chairman's working paper. It is imperative that technologies and know-how relating to the production of weapons of mass destruction be effectively prevented from spreading.

In this respect, export control regimes have a vital role to play, including transfers of dual-use technologies. It must be emphasized that the purpose of these regimes is to prevent misuse. They are not intended to be, and, indeed, should not be, obstacles to access to technologies for peaceful and legitimate purposes.

The Commission will now start work on the new agenda item "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". My Government welcomes the fact that the international

community now devotes increasing attention to questions relating to conventional weapons, as evidenced, *inter alia*, by the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Sweden attaches great importance to measures aimed at a higher degree of transparency in the field of conventional weapons as a means of promoting confidence and curbing excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups. The illicit arms trade is one aspect of the overall question of international arms transfers and must be seriously studied and dealt with. My delegation has taken note with interest of the working paper submitted by Colombia, which constitutes an important contribution to the work of the Commission.

The issue of non-proliferation has come to occupy an increasingly central place in international arms control and disarmament in recent years and is reflected in our agenda. Sweden presented in 1992 a proposal for a new agenda item entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction". Broad support has been registered for this proposal. We propose that at its organizational session later this year, the Disarmament Commission should decide to include this item in its agenda for the 1995 substantive session.

Let me conclude by expressing my delegation's hope that this year's substantive session will take place in an atmosphere conducive to cooperation and progress in the important tasks before us. I am confident that the successful completion of items on our agenda, followed by the regular inclusion of new and topical ones, will contribute to the standing and significance of this body within the disarmament machinery. It is at the same time important that the Disarmament Commission, as well as other disarmament forums, pursue its overall efforts aimed at reform and adaptation to new developments.

Ms. Mason (Canada): Those who have participated in the last two years of the work of the multilateral deliberative bodies will recall that, in the interest of saving time and money during the plenary stage of our work, I have circulated my written text and then given an extremely short oral summary. I commended that example to others - not very successfully, I must say. However, having said that, I now find myself in the somewhat humble position of being about to embark on a lengthy oral submission without having as yet a written text to circulate.

Let me underscore that I do not now commend this example to other members, and let me also assure delegations that might be interested that, technology willing, a written text of my remarks will appear at the back of the room some time this afternoon.

(spoke in French)

I should like to begin, Mr. Chairman, by thanking your predecessor, Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil, for his important contribution both to the progress made in reforming the procedures of the Disarmament Commission and to the substantive work accomplished last year. Allow me also to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Commission for this session and on yesterday's promising start. I am convinced that we shall succeed if we continue to work so efficiently with cooperation and determination. Serving on the Commission's Bureau at this time is an honour in which I take great pride.

(spoke in English)

The 1994 session of the Disarmament Commission begins at a time of continuing turbulence and transition in international affairs. Everywhere, it seems, new challenges are being posed to the agonizingly slow process of cooperative security building made possible by the end of the cold war.

At the same time, however, it is undeniable that progress is being made on a range of disarmament questions at a rate that even one year ago would have been considered unachievable. I have in mind, of course, the negotiations now well under way in Geneva on the comprehensive test-ban treaty; the ongoing consultations, also in the Conference on Disarmament, regarding a cut-off in the production of fissile material for nuclear-explosive purposes; the successful conclusion of the second Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference on extending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and the special conference to be held in September, the preparatory work for which has just been completed, to consider measures to strengthen verification of the bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons Convention. That is not to mention the United Nations arms register and the verification experts Group. Of course, in each one of the areas identified there are significant obstacles still to be overcome. But the fact remains that processes are in place which offer the prospect of overcoming those obstacles.

This is the backdrop against which we begin this session of the Disarmament Commission, a global deliberative body in an environment which is increasingly

action-oriented - or should I say reaction-oriented? I believe it is precisely because of this apparent juxtaposition of purposes or priorities, that, as you pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the credibility of the Commission is once again at stake.

On the one hand, it is perhaps inevitable that in circumstances in which concrete action is urgently needed deliberative bodies will be suspect as mere "talk shops", even when consensus is reached on recommendations and guidelines, let alone when it is not.

Yet those of us who are believers in - even aficionados of - the Disarmament Commission would point to the indispensable role that it can play in building the genuine consensus that is the essential underpinning of global norms, global agreements, global rules of the road, and without which it is simply impossible to promote international cooperation in general or cooperative security-building in particular.

As we all know, the role of the Commission is to provide focused consideration of a limited number of items with a view to reaching agreement on guidelines and recommendations with respect to those items. As such, it offers an opportunity to go into more depth than is possible in the First Committee with respect to issues not yet ripe for negotiations elsewhere.

Under its reformed working methods, the Commission was successful in concluding, by consensus, guidelines and recommendations on objective information in military matters in 1992 and on regional approaches to disarmament in 1993. Both documents built on previous consensus guidelines dealing with confidence-building measures and verification principles

In past plenary statements to this body I have discussed the important role of the United Nations in providing a framework and a catalyst for discussions on arms control and disarmament issues, as one aspect of promoting regional and subregional security dialogue. The agreed principles of openness and transparency in military matters and the three years of intensive discussion that preceded them - not to mention the several years of discussion on confidence-building measures, of which transparency is a key theme - all helped lay the groundwork for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. That global initiative, in turn, is proving to be a powerful impetus for regional discussions in Latin America, within the Organization of American States (OAS), and in South-East Asia, within the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum, to give but two examples.

Likewise, the Commission's guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament are an important, practical tool in promoting and facilitating such approaches, particularly in regions and subregions lacking in well-developed "habits of dialogue" on security issues.

This is to say that the role of the Disarmament Commission is not only to broaden understanding and common ground on particular disarmament questions, but also to provide concrete tools for States to have at their disposal in global, regional, subregional and even bilateral contexts as they seek to address their particular security concerns.

I should like to turn briefly now to the three agenda items before us.

In considering agenda item 4, "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", it must first be recalled that, unlike what happened over the other issues on the "new" agenda - objective information in military matters, regional approaches and science and technology - agreement has not been reached to focus consideration in any way. In other words, this item, in fact, encompasses the entire ambit of nuclear disarmament issues. This sheer breadth of scope, coupled with the fact that critical aspects of the subject-matter are now under negotiation elsewhere, has led to the anomaly that the most important subject-matter - in the view, at least, of the majority of delegations present here - has received the least amount of systematic attention during the three years it has been on the agenda, and this I hasten to add, despite the monumental efforts of the Chairmen charged with the task of reaching agreement on this omnibus item.

In the light of this past history, then, I wonder whether a serious discussion of exactly where we want to go with this item is not in order. For example, what exactly is the relationship between our work here and those aspects of the nuclear issue which are under active multilateral consideration elsewhere? Such a discussion might help us better identify a narrower - but perhaps more achievable - basis for successfully concluding our work this year on this important item.

I turn now to agenda item 6, "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly

resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". Canada very much welcomes the addition to the Disarmament Commission's agenda of the item on the illicit transfer of arms. This issue was clearly identified by the Secretary-General, in his address earlier this year to his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, as an important one bearing on international peace and security. It is unique in many respects and will challenge the traditional approach to arms control. Nevertheless, this issue is clearly about the control of arms and is of direct relevance and consequence for a great many United Nations Member States. I congratulate Colombia on its consistent efforts in the field of international arms transfers, dating back well before 1988, when Colombia and Italy combined their draft resolutions on this issue. This initiative led eventually to the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The paper provided by Ambassador Jaramillo on "Guidelines for the control of international arms transfers aimed at eradicating the illicit arms trade" is a very useful introduction to the range of questions that need to be addressed. Illicit transfers of arms are clearly destabilizing in many countries, and it is incumbent upon us to make rapid progress in this area. Given the direction provided by the Colombian text, I expect that in the first year of consideration of this item we will be able to identify the key areas wherein further discussion next year will be warranted.

The Secretary-General, in his "New Dimensions", urged us better to integrate disarmament and arms-control efforts into the wider processes of international-security building. In Canada's view, this agenda item offers us an opportunity to do just that.

I turn now to agenda item 5: "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". Bearing in mind that I, wearing my Chairperson's hat, will make a statement on Wednesday morning on all four sub-items of the science and technology issue, my intention now is to confine my remarks to what is widely agreed to be the most important - and certainly the most contentious - part of the agenda item, that is section III, on the transfer of sensitive dual-use technologies.

As I stated on behalf of Canada at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission, we strongly believe that this issue merits our close attention because it offers us an opportunity to broaden international agreement in a particularly difficult area of non-proliferation: the transfer of sensitive technologies. In our view, we must find ways to ensure that technology developed for peaceful purposes does not find its way into the hands of those seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. At the same time, the application of such technologies for economic and social development must be encouraged.

In our view, the way to attain both objectives is to make the commitment to, and fulfilment of, comprehensive non-proliferation norms or standards a *sine qua non* for the promotion of international cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technologies. Once this framework for cooperation has been established on a Government-to-Government basis, the way is then clear for the respective commercial sectors of the countries in question to pursue mutually advantageous arrangements.

As we have heard in statement after statement, the international community is engaged in a wide variety of efforts to develop global, comprehensive, effectively verifiable non-proliferation regimes to regulate the transfer of material, equipment and sensitive technologies which have the potential for use in research, development, acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that the Disarmament Commission can make a tangible contribution to these broader efforts if agreement can be reached on guidelines which genuinely enhance the prospects for transferring sensitive technologies solely for peaceful purposes.

Let me next recall certain observations I made at the close of the last session in the light of the inability of the Working Group to conclude its work on this agenda item successfully. I said that, to put it at its plainest, the subject matter of the Working Group required it to confront fundamental differences of perspective between supplier and recipient States in the area of the transfer of technology with military applications. Yet the fact is that, whatever those differences, suppliers and recipients need each other if either side is satisfactorily to advance its non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation objectives. In other words, what is required is a joint approach which adequately reflects the views of both suppliers and recipients in a way that meets our twin objectives of enhancing international security and promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes.

I then went on to single out two paragraphs in particular - paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Chairman's text, which can be found in annex III of last year's report - which, in Canada's view, reflect not only the efforts made

but also the progress achieved in bridging the gap between supplier and recipient States.

It is from this perspective, then, that Canada now approaches the task of securing a consensus text on the science and technology item. It is clear that the gap in perceptions, perspectives and priorities, which thwarted all our best efforts last session, has yet to be sufficiently narrowed to enable us to conclude our work successfully in this fourth and final year. It is equally clear that the most profound of those differences can neither be overcome, nor unduly minimized, if the agreement is to be worthy of the effort it will undoubtedly take to achieve. It is none the less our fervent view that a meaningful consensus text - that is, one which advances our twin objectives of non-proliferation and peaceful commerce - is within reach, if we can only persevere and, I might add, find the right balance between fudging and fighting. We therefore look forward to working with all other interested delegations to this end.

I have now expounded at some length on why Canada attaches importance to the successful conclusion of our work on agenda item 5. Beyond that, however, is the broader issue with which I began: the value of the Disarmament Commission's deliberative role. The range of problems besetting the international community continues to grow at a pace which despite our best efforts still far exceeds our capacity to devise and implement workable solutions. Nowhere is this truer than in the field of international security, where it seems that virtually all of our respective countries' attention and energy are directed at managing crises. If we are to make any headway in reversing that trend, and in expending more of our ever shrinking resources on tackling the underlying causes of international tensions, then every aspect of the multilateral disarmament machinery available to the international community must be utilized to its fullest. That in turn means that we must all count on the understanding, cooperation and perseverance of each participant in the process. It is only in this spirit of good will and common cause that we can ensure that the Disarmament Commission plays its full part in helping to build a world where cooperative security is no longer the exception but the norm.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): I should like first to extend my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, on your unanimous election to preside over our deliberations. It is particularly gratifying to note that you are a seasoned diplomat from Benin, a country with which Indonesia has recently established diplomatic relations. We are confident that, under your stewardship, the Commission at this session will be able to achieve substantive progress. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the other members of the Bureau on their election.

To Ambassador Luiz de Araujo Castro of Brazil, who so ably presided over the Commission's work last year, I convey our sincere appreciation.

This year's session of the Disarmament Commission is being held against the backdrop of some encouraging developments. The process of nuclear disarmament has continued to make progress, albeit at an excruciatingly slow pace. The successful conclusion of START II between the United States and the Russian Federation has made an important contribution to reducing their awesome arsenals. It is our justifiable expectation that this process of concrete nuclear-arms reductions will continue with the participation of other nuclear-weapon States. We also welcome the announcement made by the United States concerning a ban on the production of nuclear materials for weapons, concerning international inspection of its stockpiles and concerning the extension of the moratorium on nuclear testing until September next year. We are gratified, too, that the prospects for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty have been bolstered by some encouraging developments.

But we are also acutely conscious of the formidable roadblocks that remain on the priority issue of nuclear disarmament. The inability so far to ratify the agreements on the reduction of strategic armaments, together with the problems posed by the control and management of vast nuclear arsenals, has ominous implications for global security. The situation has been further exacerbated by the problem of the destruction of existing arsenals inherited as a result of geopolitical realignments in the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, military expenditures and armament production have increased precipitously - both qualitatively and quantitatively - in some regions. Consequently, the disarmament dividend has been meagre compared to widespread expectations and the positive changes in the international political climate. It is against this backdrop that the agenda items now before us call for our renewed attention.

With regard to the item on nuclear disarmament, it is undeniable that, since the destructive power of nuclear weapons can reach all corners of the globe, the security of each nation is inextricably linked to the collective security

of all nations. Furthermore, an integral relationship exists between various stages of nuclear disarmament on the one hand and international security on the other. Hence, it bears reiterating that the process of nuclear disarmament should be implemented within a set time-frame. Of equal importance is a clear and unambiguous definition of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear States in multilateral endeavours to achieve the common goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, which must remain our priority objective. Meanwhile, it would not suffice to prohibit the use only of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. In our view, the use of all such weapons - particularly nuclear weapons - must be banned as a crime against humanity and that ban must be formalized in a binding international convention.

We believe that the Chairman's paper on the subject provides a useful basis for our continued endeavours to achieve the substantial convergence of views which has eluded us so far. As the Commission is expected to complete the consideration of this item during this session, my delegation is hopeful that, on an issue which critically affects all mankind, it will be possible to formulate guidelines and/or recommendations for negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is gratifying to note that during last year's session of the Disarmament Commission substantive progress was achieved on the agenda item on science and technology. Our consideration of this question, which is of interest to all Member States, has facilitated the identification of relevant scientific and technological developments that offer the greatest prospects for the deceleration of the arms race.

Regrettably, however, differences persist which have prevented us from concluding this agenda item. The central question facing us is that of ensuring the widening use of relevant technology in a way that poses no risk to peace and security, since the technology involved for military and non-military purposes is similar in many respects. Many developing countries are aware of the weapons-proliferation risks posed by the diffusion of technology and are therefore committed to peaceful uses. For these nations, the acquisition of technology, materials and training for their socio-economic development is of paramount importance. To deny them, especially through exclusive clubs and restrictive practices, cannot but have a detrimental impact on their development objectives.

Hence, peaceful uses of scientific advances should be fostered, and the misplaced fear of the military use of technology must not be used to bar developing countries' access to technology they desperately need for economic progress. We therefore oppose unilateral and discriminatory measures and call for universally acceptable norms and guidelines for access to technology. Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that developments in science and technology have implications for verifying existing and future disarmament agreements through the establishment of a satellite-monitoring agency under the auspices of the United Nations in order to facilitate the process of concrete disarmament measures at the global, regional and subregional levels.

The issue of international arms transfers has for many years been of concern to the global community. It is only in recent times, however, that this question has been given such high priority on the disarmament agenda. It is pertinent to recall in this context that General Assembly resolution 43/75 I initiated multilateral action to restrain arms sales, and that resolution 46/36 L clearly defined the duties and obligations of Member States. There is indeed an imperative need to take a collective look at this problem in the context of the flourishing arms trade in order to focus on ways and means through which an international consensus can be reached.

In this context, my delegation has long viewed the availability of relevant information as an essential prerequisite for overcoming apprehension, establishing mutual confidence, promoting more open military policies, and above all facilitating the process of disarmament. It has assumed ever greater importance, particularly in areas where persistent mistrust and miscommunication have long frustrated the initiation of arms-reduction talks. We also fully recognize the need to curb the production and transfer of such armaments, given the global prevalence of conventional armaments and the mounting expenditures involved.

It should be noted, however, that the rapid accumulation and further qualitative refinement of conventional armaments are being pursued by the States which already possess the largest military arsenals and which develop, produce, stockpile and sell by far the greatest proportion of these armaments. Moreover, the proportion of arms purchased by these developing countries pales in significance in comparison with the arms acquired and deployed by the developed nations.

Hence, the issues involved in the regulation of arms transfers should be viewed from different perspectives, since they give rise to different concerns. First, in the

context of weapons needed by the newly-independent countries in consolidating their hard-won freedom and ensuring their self-defence capabilities, arms transfers are not necessarily destabilizing as long as they conform to legitimate national-security considerations. Secondly, armaments are also essential components of subregional and regional security, and cooperation between the States involved can contribute significantly to easing the search for more armaments.

In this regard, my delegation is aware of the Register of Conventional Arms to which Member States are called on to provide data on an annual basis. It is intended to be global in nature and voluntary in character. It is aimed at promoting enhanced levels of transparency in armaments and thereby contributing to confidence-building, promoting stability and strengthening regional and international peace and security. It is also intended to provide pertinent information with regard to the objective of promoting arms restraint on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis and to assess the trend towards arms transfers. But the present unconscionable level of trade in armaments, despite the palpable change in the global political and security climate, is directly attributable to a lack of restraint by the supplier countries.

This is fully evident in accelerated efforts in the sale of arms, especially to conflict-ridden areas. Hence, efforts at reducing and curbing conventional and other armaments should be placed within a comprehensive context, focus on both supplier and recipient countries, rather than on particular groups of countries, and be directed towards the primary causes of the frantic search for and further accumulation of conventional armaments.

While we await a further report by the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of this Register, its further evolution should, in our view, include a full description of such transfers and go beyond the categories of weapons already identified in the current Register to include those which have a destabilizing impact on regional and global security.

The Chairman *(interpretation from French)*: There are 19 names inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon. I think that will cause difficulty. On the other hand, this morning, thanks to members' wisdom and punctuality and their appreciation of the need to conserve our time, we have been able to move swiftly. Indeed, there are only a few speakers left for this morning, and we are therefore ahead of our schedule.

I should like to make a friendly appeal to any member of the Commission scheduled to speak this afternoon who is prepared to speak this morning to do so. That would make possible a better use of the time available to us this afternoon and would enable us not to eat into the time allotted for the meetings of the Working Groups by having to schedule another plenary meeting for this general exchange of views. That would not be productive at all.

I therefore appeal to any representative whose texts are ready to speak this morning. Perhaps if the text is not completely ready, they could speak now and distribute a definitive copy later.

We have had a very good example of that procedure this morning.

The officers of the Commission would be very grateful if members could assist us in this matter. The secretariat is available to inscribe the names of any representatives who would be prepared to speak this morning.

Mr. Khandogy (Ukraine) *(interpretation from Russian)*: On behalf of the delegation of Ukraine, I should like first of all to congratulate you, Sir, and the other officers of the Commission on your election to these important posts. I wish all of you successful and fruitful work.

The year that has passed since our last session has been filled with very important events in the field of arms reduction and disarmament.

Ukraine, which inherited a nuclear potential from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, began to eliminate its strategic nuclear materials with a view to eliminating all nuclear weapons from our territory and acquiring non-nuclear status.

As the Commission knows, implementation of Ukraine's unilateral obligation to free itself of nuclear weaponry met with some serious political, economic, financial and technical problems. Not only the political leadership of our country but also a significant part of Ukrainian society - as was clear from many surveys of public opinion - had the impression that the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine had become a purpose in itself in the eyes of some Powers. Hence, the question of our national security was raised in this connection.

Fortunately, the sincere wishes of the leadership of the United States, Russia and other States helped us to move ahead towards nuclear disarmament and to draft compromise, mutually acceptable solutions, which then became part of the Trilateral Statement signed by the Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine in Moscow on 14 January this year. Under that Statement, the United States and Russia are obliged to provide Ukraine with guarantees of our national security as soon as the START I Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Furthermore, Russia and the United States reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the CSCE States. They also reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The Statement also contains a commitment to refrain from economic coercion. Furthermore, assistance is to be provided to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, if it should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. During this meeting of the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia and the United States, the importance of compensation to Ukraine for eliminating its nuclear materials was also recognized.

All this meant that the Ukrainian Parliament was able to overcome its reservations in respect of article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol, and this opened the path to Ukraine's acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I should also like to note that Ukraine is participating as an observer in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review Conference.

Global non-proliferation is now the focus of international efforts and policies. Ukraine believes that all the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty should fully implement their obligations under it. The nuclear States have given guarantees to Ukraine, and they should serve as a basis for a binding mechanism of guarantees. The absence of such a mechanism is currently one of the main impediments to the establishment of a nuclear-free world.

Another very important issue before us is that of a complete test ban. In this connection, Ukraine is working in the Conference on Disarmament to ensure that such a ban is achieved. Ukraine is also working on the conceptual provisions of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We believe that all the interested States should have an opportunity to make their contribution to the drafting of this treaty. This includes States that have inherited a nuclear arsenal from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and also threshold States.

An important role can be played by scientific and technical advances, including those in the nuclear field. The peaceful element of this dual-use technology can be utilized in the establishment of a global system for monitoring underground explosions and areas where there might be conflicts.

In our view, the positive potential of science and technology for disarmament purposes can, for example, help the process of converting military potential for civilian ends. This problem, with all its implications, faces Ukraine today. We trust that the international community will offer both political support and material assistance in reaching a solution, which would speed up the emergence of Ukraine's economy from crisis and promote the stabilization of the political situation, not just in our country, but also across the territory of the former USSR.

At the same time, it should be noted that the transfer of advanced technology with military applications entails the threat of dispersing the most fearsome kinds of weapons, primarily weapons of mass destruction, throughout the world. The delegation of Ukraine believes that the time has come to draft and sign multilateral international legal instruments to improve the mechanism for the transfer of advanced technological products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes, while not permitting their use for military ends.

Ukraine believes that in resolving questions of arms transfers we must take into account both the preservation of international peace and security and support for regional stability, as well as each State's foreign policy interests and its national and economic security. We believe that arms supplies designed to help States meet their legitimate self-defence needs are fully justifiable. They serve as an adequate response to military threat and heighten the ability of the recipient country to take part in regional or other collective measures arising from decisions of the United Nations or other international organs. The export of weapons is unjustifiable when it promotes the escalation and deepening of existing armed conflicts, destabilizes the situation in a region, or supports international terrorism, or when the weapons are used to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign States or to work against international treaties and agreements already arrived at.

The Ukrainian delegation hopes that at this session, on this and other questions on its agenda, the Commission can achieve practical decisions ensuring a real connection between "United Nations-style" disarmament and negotiated disarmament.

The Ukrainian delegation will cooperate constructively with you, Sir, and with all interested delegations in order to ensure the success of our work.

The Chairman *(interpretation from French)*: There has been no response to my appeal for more speakers. We have exhausted our list of speakers for this morning and no speakers on this afternoon's list have agreed to speak this morning in order to shorten the long list we have for this afternoon. It now appears that we have 20 speakers for this afternoon. Since we have no volunteers to speak this morning, I shall adjourn the meeting now and resume at 3 p.m. sharp.

The meeting rose at noon.